<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIt seems obvious but can be sometime forgotten in the middle of heavy technical discussion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We ARE NOT aiming everyone 100 % satisfaction, we are aiming consensus<\/strong>, compromise<\/strong> and simplicity<\/strong> for a wide adoption.<\/p>\n\n\n\nAdoption is not necessary synonym of complexity or exhaustivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Minimize the learning curve<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIncident (and intrusion) detection is a complex field. The recent rise of IoT and IIoT makes it even more complex adding new potential attack surfaces. One has to learn a lot of concepts to deploy efficient incident detection systems. IDMEFv2 needs to be easy to learn and to implement. It should manipulate essentially widespread concepts and at the same time leave optional ways of dealing with very complex needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Usability<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nThe same way as “learning curve principle”, IDMEFv2 should manipulate widespread and easy to deploy technologies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This principle partly led us to choose JSON representation as well as HTTPs for transport implementation. Nowadays JSON is widely adopted and specially in incident detection tools, log management console and NOSQL database. HTTP is obviously one of the most used and popular Internet protocol. Other format and transport are possible but we will focus on those two choices first.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Simplicity vs exhaustivity<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nFollowing the “Less is more” quote as well a the KISS method (Keep It Simple, Stupid) IDMEFv2 should be as simple as possible, while still answering all the needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IDMEFv1 was very exhaustive : 33 classes, 108 attributes, 260 possible combinations, potential infinite recursivity, etc. In theory this could be an advantage but in practice it had many disadvantage : long learning curve, complex code implementation, more misinterpretation, \u2026 This REX led to a much smaller number of classes and attributes in IDMEFv2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Agnostic format, classes and attributes<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nTo respect most of the principles we have already presented IDMEFv2 classes and attributes should be as agnostic as possible. We are not creating a format composed of cyber classes\/attributes and physical classes\/attributes. We need to use concept and define classes and attributes that can be used indifferently in the two domains as much as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Attribute Enumeration<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nAs often as possible, IDMEFv2 must propose enumeration for attributes value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The purpose of standardizing incident detection message exchange goes beyond the simple exchange of information between analyser and managers. Alerts must be compared, analyzed, aggregated, correlated, etc. Thus it is important that some attributes propose “closed list” values other wise comparison\/filtering\/ordering is impossible. This is a difficult choice as “closed enumeration lists” are always limited and frustrating but this is essential. Means will be proposed to extend the close list if essential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Theory AND practice<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nMany theoretically very good standards have failed when confronted to reality. IDMEFv2 must avoid this pitfall. IDMEFv2 has been tested in real situation during the first stage of it’s definition. Today, libraries and tools are available to continue testing as the definition is being tuned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Avoid the NIH syndrome<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nFight the NIH (Not Invented Here) syndrome<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Incident detection is not a brand new field. There is a lot of existing formats which cover part of the problem. It is important when possible to reuse existing concepts which have already proven to be efficient. During the analysis phase, many different log\/event\/incident\/alert formats have been studied to extract interesting concepts. Among others, IDMEFv2 reuses concepts, classes or attributes from :<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n- IDMEFv1 : Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format v1<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- IODEF v2 : Incident Object Definition Exchange Format<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- IDEA : Intrusion Detection Extensible Alert<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Log Management and SIEM tools IBM (Leef), HP (CEF) , Splunk, Elastic (ECS), Logpoint<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- RIST – ENISA : Reference Security Incident Taxonomy<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Ecosystem & interoperability<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIncident detection is a part of a more global puzzle using other exchange formats. IDMEFv2 has to feet correctly in this larger architecture avoiding to overlap other format perimeter when it’s possible. IDMEFv2 should also interoperate with existing formats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Legacy<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIDMEFv2 should be usable into existing architecture using proprietary formats. The ultimate goal would be that all detection tools, may they be analyser or managers, cyber or physical natively use the IDMEFv2 format, but obviously this can’t happen suddenly so it has to be “easily” possible to start using IDMEFv2 in an existing system without having to change all it’s component at once.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>End to end format : From the probe to the operator.<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIDMEFv2 alerts are created by analyzers and sent to managers. But the life of an alert doesn’t end when it’s received by a manager. It can be correlated, aggregated, stored, indexed, etc. and then it will be displayed to operators in a GUI (Graphical User Interface). It might even be used to created other messages in other format. This end to end usage has to be taken in consideration while designing the format: from the analyzer to the operator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Modularity<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nOne should be able to use only some parts of IDMEFv2<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IDMEFv2 aim to cover all type of incident detection : Cyber , Physical, Availability and also Cyber Threats, Natural Hazard Threats, etc. It is very important that IDMEFv2 can be used on smaller perimeters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As examples :<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n- IDMEFv2 can be used in a full cyber intrusion detection architecture with no physical detectors nor sensors.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- IDMEFv2 can be used in a full physical incident detection architecture with no cyber detectors nor censors<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
<\/span>Cope with the past and prepare the future<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIDMEFv2 must be able to deal with all the existing concept in incident detection but also leave room for incident detection evolution in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As already mentioned bellow, the field of incident detection, at least for the cyber part, isn’t new and concepts are already used. IDMEFv2 must be able to interoperate with all this past. On the other end, standardising a format is a long task that can’t be renewed frequently. The field of incident detection is evolving very fast : rise of IoT and IIoT, growth of cyber-criminality, new types of attacks, smart-“everything”, etc. Organisations must also be prepared to face natural hazard threats and incidents rise due to climate change. IDMEFv2 must anticipate all those needs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Introduction Proposing a new standard is a tough and uncertain task. A standard has to be complex enough to please everyone and simple enough to frighten no one. IDMEFv2 mixes multiple concepts cyber and physical. But IDMEFv2 can potentially be used by a lot of different type of users, security tools developers , integrators, operators,… Read More »Standardization principles<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":""},"yoast_head":"\nStandardization principles - Task Force<\/title>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n